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Jakob von Weizsäcker (Bruegel) 
 
Welcome to Europe: A European Blue Card Proposal1 
 
 
 
Summary 
 
This contribution argues that the EU should open up to skilled immigrants through a points 
system via a European “Blue Card” granting access to its entire labour market. This European 
version of the Green Card could become a powerful complement to any national effort to attract 
top talent. In addition, students graduating with a Masters degree or equivalent from European 
universities or from top universities abroad should be automatically eligible for a Blue Card. This 
“Blue Diploma” would help attract young talent early. Finally, in future rounds of EU 
enlargement, higher-skilled workers should be welcome immediately, provided they reach an 
earnings threshold: the “External Minimum Wage”.  
 
In Section 1, a tentative explanation of why many countries in Europe are falling behind in the 
global competition for talent is provided. In Section 2, key facts of migration, its skill content, 
and the increasing supply of skills worldwide are examined. In Section 3, the basic efficiency and 
distribution arguments for and against high and low-skilled migration are analysed. The impact of 
emigration - “brain drain” and “brain gain” - on developing source countries is also discussed. 
Finally, Section 4 proposes potential policy options for Europe to attract high-skilled migrants 
and addresses a number of frequently raised objections and concerns.  
 
 
1.  Laggards in a Global Competition for Talent 
 
Why are many European countries finding it so difficult to effectively participate in the global 
competition for talent? For example, Germany’s new immigration law of 2004 was touted as an 
important step forward to attract more high-skilled immigrants. But during 2005, less than 1000 
high-skilled immigrants came to Germany under the restrictive and timid provisions under that 
law. France is currently discussing an immigration bill that also contains provisions for high-
skilled immigration. However, the special provisions regarding “compétences et talents” don’t 
seem to be a particularly courageous step forward either. 
 
One explanation for these difficulties in agreeing on a policy framework that will succeed in 
attracting more high-skilled migrants might be the popular but flawed idea that the capacity for 
absorbing immigrants is essentially fixed, say at 100 000 per year, and the only question is: How 
should these immigration slots be allocated? If the number of slots were fixed, a moral case could 
be made to give the available slots to the most deserving: those suffering from political 
persecution, from abject poverty, from family separation. And an economic case could be made 
that the slots should be given those who would benefit the local economy the most: highly skilled 
immigrants. Thus, there would be a head-on conflict between what is morally right and what is in 
                                                 
1 This paper is based on an article published in the Horizons stratégiques (Revue trimestrielle du Centre d'analyse 
stratégique in Paris). It is an extended version of Bruegel Policy Brief 2006/03.  
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the national interest. Therefore, any policy aiming to attract high-skilled migrants could be 
accused of being a political trick that implicitly cracks down on morally more deserving 
migration. 
 
But reality is different. The number of migrants that a country is willing to absorb is not fixed. In 
particular, the immigration of high-skilled workers need not reduce the capacity to absorb less 
skilled and perhaps morally more deserving migration. This is illustrated in Table 1. Canada, 
Switzerland, and Australia, the countries with a points system for immigration, have a strong bias 
in favour of highly skilled immigrants. But this does not appear to have come at the expense of 
less skilled immigrants. Foreign born without tertiary education make up only 8 percent of the 
population in France, the Netherlands and Belgium, and 11 percent of the population in 
Germany. By contrast, in the three countries with a points system, the foreign born without 
tertiary education amount to 12 percent of the population in Canada, 14 percent of the population 
in Australia, and 17 percent of the population in Switzerland.  
 
Table 1 – International comparison of the extent and skill composition of migration 
 
Country % foreign-
born 
% with 
tertiary 
natives 
Education 
among 
foreign-born 
High-skilled 
foreign-born 
(% total 
population) 
Points 
system to 
attract high-
skilled as of:
Poland 2,1 10,4 11,9 0,2 N/A 
Spain 5,3 19,4 21,8 1,2 N/A 
Portugal 6,3 7,7 19,3 1,2 N/A 
Denmark 6,8 18,8 19,5 1,3 N/A 
United Kingdom 8,3 20,1 34,8 2,9 2007* 
France 10,0 16,9 18,1 1,8 N/A 
Netherlands 10,1 19,5 17,6 1,8 N/A 
Belgium 10,7 22,9 21,6 2,3 N/A 
Sweden 12,0 22,8 24,2 2,9 N/A 
United States 12,3 26,9 25,9 3,2 N/A 
Germany 12,5 19,5 15,5 1,9  N/A 
Canada 19,3 31,5 38,0 7,3 1967 
Switzerland 22,4 18,1 23,7 5,3 1996 
Australia 23,0 38,6 42,9 9,9  1984 
Note: *Expected date following announcement by UK Home Office in March 2006 
Source: Dumont and Lemaître (2004) 
 
Thus, decisions on high-skilled immigration and on low-skilled immigration can to a large extent 
be treated separately. But should they be? Economic effects of high-skilled immigration are 
generally positive for the receiving country while low-skilled migration has more ambiguous 
effects, as shown further below. Hence, decisions about attracting more high-skilled immigration 
will tend to be relatively easy. By contrast, decisions regarding low-skilled migration often prove 
highly complex and controversial for both economic and non-economic reasons. By bundling the 
discussion of high and low-skilled migration together, many European countries, including 
France and Germany, are loosing valuable time in the global competition for talent.  
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The case for a separate and accelerated treatment of the issue of high-skilled immigration is 
further reinforced by the potentially benign effect that successful high-skilled immigration 
policies might have on the politics of integration. Greater numbers of immigration success stories 
in the economic and scientific arena could help to reduce any exaggerated anxieties associated 
with immigration and immigrants overall. Furthermore, high-skilled migrants may also have a 
positive direct effect on existing migrant communities, for example through the availability of 
new roles models. Hence, instead of reducing the number of available slots for low-skilled 
migrants, more high-skilled migration might well increase the willingness to absorb more low-
skilled migrants at the same time. 
 
In order to attract more highly skilled migrants, this article proposes the introduction of a “Blue 
Card”, a European version of the US Green Card that would provide highly skilled third country 
nationals with instant access to the entire European labour market. The Blue Card would be 
allocated on the basis of skill through a Europe wide points system. Such an EU wide system 
would be more attractive than any national system from the perspective of high-skilled 
immigrants. Also, a European solution would provide greater visibility, predictability, and 
transparency than 25 different national systems.  
 
 
2.  Migration and the global supply of skills 
 
Immigration rates in the EU-15 and the US remained at relatively moderate levels during the 
1960s, 1970s, and most of the 1980s, as shown in Chart 1. Migration rates only shot up in the late 
eighties and early nineties. They rose again substantially in the early 2000s in Europe in 
particular, driven by immigration to the EU-15 from Eastern Europe. In addition, there is 
significant illegal immigration. 
 
 
Chart 1 – Recent increase in immigration to the EU and the US 
 
2000-20041990-19991980-19891970-19791960-1969
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
3,5
4
4,5
R
at
e 
pe
r 1
,0
00
 in
ha
bi
ta
nt
s
US Immigration EU-15 net migration
 
Source: Eurostat, US Office of Immigration Statistics, US Census Bureau 
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In order to gauge the potential importance of increasing migration flows for economic 
development, it is instructive to compare the gross inflow into the working age population 
through demography and through migration. As shown in Chart 1b, the age adjusted immigration 
inflow into the workforce exceeds 30 percent of the gross demographic inflow into the 
workforce. For example, in the UK, for 100 persons entering working age with their twentieth 
birthday (and that includes 1st and 2nd generation migrants who entered the UK before there 20th 
birthday), there are the equivalent of 30 fresh immigrants aged twenty entering the UK. 
Therefore, it is clear that the skill composition of this important immigration inflow, and the 
average length of stay of migrants as a function of skill has a substantial impact on the 
composition of the European labour forces over the coming decades.   
 
 
 
Chart 1b – Age adjusted gross immigration inflow to the working age population as % of 
gross demographic inflow into the working age population 
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Source: Eurostat, own calculations 
Definitions: Age adjusted gross immigration inflow into the working population: immigration 
inflow aged 20 to 60, with 20 year olds receiving weight 1, 40 year olds receiving weight 0.5, and 
60 year olds receiving weight 0. Gross demographic inflow: number of people turning 20 years old 
in a given year.  
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Over the coming years, migration rates and migration pressures might well increase further. 
Globalisation is rapidly “shrinking” the world without shrinking worldwide income differences 
quite as fast. There are concerns in Europe over this influx of immigrants, and low-skilled 
immigrants in particular. At the same time, to become a competitive and dynamic knowledge-
driven economy as spelled out in the Lisbon agenda, Europe will need to become much better at 
attracting talent from the rest of the world. Pisani-Ferry (2006) demonstrates that the EU-15 have 
levels of physical capital similar to the US but substantially lower human capital endowment. 
Such relative “overcapitalization” may not be sustainable. In addition to improved education 
policies, it seems plausible that migration policy may be able to play a role in closing the human 
capital gap of Europe. 
 
The European Commission has accordingly become active in this area (Box 1). However, 
progress has been slow. Some of the reasons for this have already been mentioned in the previous 
section. In addition, many relevant stakeholders still use problematic economic concepts to 
discuss migration, most importantly the “lump-of-labour” fallacy according to which the number 
of jobs in an economy is fixed. This policy brief argues that the issue of economic migration 
should instead be framed in terms of the skill level of immigrants. 
 
Box 1: EU-Level Activity on Economic 
Migration 
Box 2: The Canadian Example of a 
Points-Based Immigration System 
A recent Policy Plan on Legal Migration 
(European Commission 2005) outlines the 
initiatives the European Commission intends 
to take over the 2006-09 period. This plan is 
based on the Green Paper, “On an EU 
Approach to Managing Economic 
Migration”, of January 2005, and the wide 
consultation that followed. 
In particular, a framework directive is 
planned in order to define a common set of 
basic rights granted to migrant workers. 
Furthermore, four specific directives would 
be designed to discipline the entry and 
residence of particular types of immigrants, 
namely highly-skilled and seasonal workers, 
intra-corporate transferees and remunerated 
trainees. 
One of the main objectives is to make the EU 
more attractive to high-skilled migrants. 
Whether this could be achieved through an 
EU work permit, similar to the Blue Card 
proposed in the brief, is under discussion. 
 
The points system for immigration was 
pioneered by Canada in 1967 and its skills 
bias was reinforced in 2001. Under the 
current rules, a foreign applicant must have 
previous work experience as a skilled 
worker to be eligible for treatment under 
the points system. Then, to be able to 
become established in Canada, a minimum 
of 67 points out of 96 have to be awarded 
on the basis of the following factors: 
- Education (up to 25 pts)  
- Proficiency in the official languages 
(up to 20 pts) 
- Experience (up to 21 pts) 
- Age with more points for younger 
migrants (up to 10 pts) 
- Arranged employment (up to 10 pts)
- Adaptability including family ties to 
Canada (up to 10 pts) 
These factors aim at capturing not only the 
economic potential but also the likelihood 
of a successful integration. 
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The differences in both the extent and the skill composition of migration, among developed 
countries, are striking. In particular, the percentage of highly-skilled foreign-born in the entire 
population varies widely, as highlighted by Table 1, in which green indicates a high percentage, 
yellow a mid-range percentage and red a low percentage of high-skilled foreign born in the 
population. 
 
Australia, Canada, and Switzerland have been phenomenally successful in attracting large 
numbers of migrants with a strong bias towards high-skilled immigration. All three countries 
have a points-based system for attracting high-skilled immigrants (Box 2). 
 
In mid-range immigration countries, the picture is much more varied. Germany, for example, has 
attracted disproportionate numbers of low-skilled immigrants, consistent with its historically 
large guest worker program. In other European countries, migration from former colonies, often 
in the aftermath of independence, has played a more important role. It particular, it is worth 
pointing out that Spain, a country with a relatively low stock of immigrants, is presently 
experiencing a massive surge in immigration, not least from South America almost 200 years 
after most countries of that continent gained independence.  
 
However, it seems that English-speaking countries generally have a distinct advantage in 
attracting high-skilled migrants, because English is the most widespread second language in the 
world. This also makes universities in English speaking countries more attractive internationally. 
This English language advantage sometimes leads other countries to conclude that they shouldn’t 
even try to engage in the global competition for talent. A viable alternative might be to try even 
harder instead.  
 
Contrary to popular perception, the US does not seem to have a high-skilled bias in its migration. 
The reason is that the high-skill bias of migration to the US from many countries of the world 
cancels out with the low-skill migration bias of the large influx of immigrants from Mexico. 
 
But what if many more countries followed the examples of Canada, Switzerland, and Australia? 
Would those other countries simply be competing for the same scarce international supply of 
skilled labour? Chart 2 helps to dispel this concern. Over the last 15 years, the number of students 
in tertiary education has increased dramatically. 
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Chart 2 – Number of students in tertiary education 
Country (pop.) 
Students 
in 1990 
(million)
Students 
in 2004 
(million) 
Students 
in 2004
(% of pop.) 
EU and proximity (958m) 21.0 36.0 3.8
 > EU-15 (381m) 9.7 13.7 3.6
 > EU-10 (74m) 1.0 3.3 3.3
 > EU Accession countries (74m) 0.4 0.9 3.0
 > EU Potential candidates (91m) 1.0 2.3 2.6
  >> Turkey (72m) 0.7 1.9 2.7
 > EU-Neighbourhood Countries (239m) 9.3 16.0 4.2
 > Russia (143m) 5.1 8.1 5.7
POP-10 (3,474m) 16.3 41.7 1.2
 > China (1,297m) 3.8 15.2 1.2
 > India (1,080m) 5.0 11.3 1.0
North-America and Antipodes (350m) 16.2 19.0 5.4
 > US (394m) 13.7 16.6  5.7
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
EU and proximity (958m)
> EU-15 (381m)
> EU-10 (74m)
> EU Accession countries (74m)
> EU Potential candidates (91m)
>> Turkey (72m)
> EU-Neighboorhood and Russia (382m)
>> Russia (143m)
POP-10 (3,474m)
> China (1,297m)
> India (1,080m)
North-America and Antipodes (350m)
> US (394m)
1990 2004
 
Source: Edstats (World Bank) 
Notes: Nearest available year used when student data missing for 1990 or 2004. Bosnia & Herzogovina, 
Armenia, Palestinian Authority, and Syria not included in EU & Proximity due to missing data. 
 
Today, the share of students in the population is in fact lower in the old EU member states (EU-
15) than in the new member states (EU-10) or the wider EU neighbourhood (EU Neighbourhood 
Policy Countries + Russia). Turkey is also catching up rapidly. 
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Even more striking is the increasing supply of skill among the Pop-102, the 10 most populous 
economies outside the US and Europe. Over the last 15 years, the Pop-10 have collectively 
increased their numbers of students by 156%. As a result, they now have more students than the 
enlarged EU and the US combined. 
 
Overall, tertiary education rates have been converging much faster than incomes. As a result, no 
shortage of young and high-skilled migrants is to be expected any time soon. If Europe wants to 
welcome more high-skilled migrants, it can. 
 
 
3.  Economics of migration: a primer 
 
Economic migration can loosely be defined as any cross-border migration that occurs to take on a 
better paid job. If pay is broadly in line with productivity, a move to a better paid job thus 
increases global economic output. This is the fundamental efficiency argument in favour of 
migration. 
 
But most people would prefer to stay at home if it wasn’t for the money. Therefore, why not 
upgrade productivity where the people currently are instead of having people chase more 
productive jobs abroad? International trade and cross-border movement of capital are helping to 
do just that. According to the classic factor price equalisation theorem of trade theory, wages 
might in principle be equalised internationally through the trade of goods alone! However, there 
are important reasons why migration pressures are likely to persist even under free trade, full 
mobility of capital, and flexible labour markets domestically. 
 
First, many poor countries suffer from an inferior “production function” because of poor 
institutions. Despite recent development success stories, upgrading poor institutions is a slow 
process. In the meantime, workers in many developing countries will continue to suffer from 
inferior wages. Migration can short-circuit this development problem by allowing workers move 
to locations with a better “production function” immediately. 
 
Second, agglomeration effects are an important rationale for migration. For example, France and 
the UK are large countries with fairly uniform institutions, free trade and free movement of 
capital. Nevertheless, workers continue to migrate to extremely expensive and crowded places 
like London or Paris. The reason is that people become more productive by virtue of geographic 
concentration. By moving to a large agglomeration, often in a foreign country, they can also hope 
to greatly improve the match between their skill and their job, thus boosting their productivity. 
 
In summary, important factors driving migration today include good institutions and 
agglomeration effects. In both areas, Europe is well positioned. In view of these important 
efficiency arguments3 for migration, why is free migration such a remote prospect? Besides non-
economic factors, distributional concerns are the main reason. 
 
 
                                                 
2 China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Mexico, Vietnam, Philippines. 
3 Strictly speaking, agglomeration effects need not improve overall efficiency, see Charlot et al. (2006). 
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3.1. Distributional Effects of Migration 
 
The basic argument is easily understood: Almost by definition, the migrant himself or herself 
derives benefits from a higher wage abroad. In the host country, wages of workers with labour 
market characteristics similar to those of the migrant can be expected to marginally decline while 
the income of those with different skills increases. Beneficiaries typically include people with 
different skills and owners of capital and land. In the source country, the wage impact will be a 
mirror image: the wage prospects of workers similar to the emigrant are set to improve while 
those with complementary factors of production would tend to suffer somewhat. 
 
On that basis, low-skilled immigrants will tend to increase income inequality among the native 
population in the host country as the already below average wages of low-skilled natives will 
come under additional pressure. By analogous arguments, high-skilled migration has a benign 
distributional impact in the host country and an adverse distributional impact in the source 
country. Ultimately, these opposing effects between different skill groups and different countries 
are likely to be at the core of any economic controversy over migration. 
 
However, while this theoretical argument is simple and compelling, it has been surprisingly 
difficult to find convincing empirical evidence to support it. In their analysis of empirical 
surveys, Longhi et al. (2005, 2006) find only a minute “consensus estimate” of the distributional 
impact: a one per cent increase in immigration only leads to a 0.12% decline in wages within the 
relevant skill segment and a 0.024% decline in employment. 
 
If this were true, it would be wonderful news. Essentially, one could stop worrying about the 
distributional implications of migration altogether. However, as Borjas (2003) has pointed out, 
most of the empirical studies that fail to find a significant distributional impact of migration focus 
on the impact of immigration on wages in small geographic areas. But such an approach fails to 
control for the endogeneity of migration. Migrants tend to be attracted to locations that have the 
most vibrant local economies and therefore typically the most attractive wages. Hence, any 
negative wage impact of immigration might be hidden by above-average wages in areas that 
manage to attract the largest numbers of migrants. 
 
By applying an econometric approach immune to this particular concern, Borjas (2003) and 
Aydemir and Borjas (2006) obtain substantially higher estimates of the wage impact of migration 
for the US, Canada, and Mexico. According to these studies, immigration of 1% reduces wages at 
the respective skilllevel by between 0.3 and 0.4% and migration could explain up to one third of 
the increase in the wage gap between low-skilled and high-skilled wages in the US over recent 
decades. Furthermore, Borjas finds in a simulation that any efficiency gains may well be tiny 
compared to these adverse distribution effects. 
 
But those findings are unlikely to mark the end of the empirical debate. Bonin (2005) applies 
Borjas’ methodology to German data and finds much smaller effects. Also, questions remain as 
to why the wage effects of classic natural experiments like the Miami Boatlift and the mass 
emigration from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries have not been more 
marked. Finally, Ottaviano and Peri (2006) find significant complementarity of native and 
foreign workers within the same skill group and they argue that only the least skilled group of 
natives in the US are likely to experience a negative wage impact due to migration. 
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In summary, the empirical literature has not been able to comprehensively dispel the 
distributional concerns that come with low-skilled migration. Therefore, such concerns cannot be 
entirely dismissed at this stage. At the same time, it seems already clear that any adverse 
distributional effects of low-skilled migration have not been the most important factor in rising 
income inequality over recent years. Hence, attempts to lay much of the blame for the economic 
stagnation of low-skilled natives in recent years on immigrants are not only politically but also 
factually misguided.  
 
Assuming a welfare function that is inequality averse, the efficiency and distributional findings 
can now be brought together. High-skilled immigration is likely to increase welfare among the 
host country population since both efficiency and equity are likely to be improved. By contrast, 
low-skilled immigration has an ambiguous welfare effect in the host country. It increases 
efficiency from the perspective of the native population provided that there is sufficient 
adjustment in the capital stock while it is probably somewhat widening the income gap between 
rich and poor in the host country. 
 
The welfare argument in favour of high-skilled immigration and the welfare ambiguity of low-
skilled immigration are reinforced by a number of additional aspects that have so far been 
neglected: 
 
? The Fiscal Impact of Migration in a Welfare State 
 
Obviously, the net fiscal impact of a high-skilled immigrant tends to be substantially more 
favourable than the net fiscal impact of a low-skilled migrant. However, even low-skilled 
immigrants can make a positive net contribution to the welfare state since pay-as-you- go 
pensions impose a large burden on young migrants. 
 
? Migration and Inflexible Labour Markets 
 
Low-skilled workers are typically more affected by poorly functioning labour markets than 
high-skilled workers. Chart 3 shows that the unemployment rate of low-skilled workers in 
Europe is systematically higher than for high-skilled workers. On average, the former stands 
at 10% in the EU while the latter is only 5% and can primarily be explained by frictional 
unemployment. This suggests that the labour market will be able to absorb high-skilled 
migrants more readily than low-skilled migrants.4 While far form perfect, Chart 3 is at least 
likely to be better guide to migration policy than the job opening statistics that are often used 
to assess migration needs. This is because job openings tend to be inflated, almost by 
definition, for sectors with high turnover which in turn is often associated with poor paid, low 
skill requirements, and seasonality. 
 
 
                                                 
4 However, if the low-skilled unemployment is due to centralized wage setting coupled with low mobility, additional low-skilled 
immigration might actually reduce unemployment by reducing the marginal productivity differentials between regions, as 
explained in Boeri and Brücker (2005). 
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Chart 3 – Unemployment in Europe by skill-level 
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Note: *Unemployment rates for worked aged 25 and over(Q2 of 2005). 
“High-Skilled” = Tertiary education; “Low-Skilled” = Primary and Lower Secondary only. 
 
? Dangers of an Ethnic Underclass 
 
There are signs that certain immigrant communities in Europe are developing into an ethnic 
underclass. It is clear that much better education and improved economic opportunities for the 
children of low-skilled migrants already in Europe, need to be provided. Migration policies 
can usefully complement such integration measures by creating a high-skill bias among fresh 
immigrants. Low-skilled immigrants already in Europe are the closest labour market 
substitutes to new low-skill immigrants. Hence, by reducing the inflow of additional 
lowskilled immigrants, the economic prospects of existing low-skilled immigrant 
communities could probably be improved. 
 
For the source country, low-skilled emigration or “brawn drain” typically improves welfare as it 
improves both efficiency and redistribution. This positive impact of low-skilled emigration is 
reinforced by remittances. Low-skilled emigrants will often help to support poor relatives in the 
source country with their higher earnings abroad. 
 
By contrast, the welfare impact of high-skilled emigration or “brain drain” is ambiguous. The 
source country may suffer from an adverse efficiency and distributional impact as a result of the 
brain drain. There will be fiscal loss since high-skilled emigrants will no longer pay taxes in their 
home country. And just as high-skilled migrants help to uplift their ethnic communities abroad, 
they could have made notable contributions to public life had they stayed at home. 
 
But a brain drain is not all bad for the source country. High-skilled migrants also send 
remittances back home. The option to emigrate may substantially increase the expected returns to 
education in the country of origin, thereby improving education incentive. Finally, if migrants 
return to their country of origin, and many of them do, the additional skills and savings they have 
acquired abroad become a powerful force of development. Therefore, moderate levels of brain 
Center for International Relations© 
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drain may actually be beneficial for the source country as, for example, argued in Beine et al. 
(2003). 
 
3.2. Win-win Migration Policies 
 
The findings of the previous sections are summarised in Figure 1: High-skilled migration tends to 
improve the welfare of the host country while the welfare impact of migration on the source 
country is ambiguous. By contrast, low-skilled migration has an ambiguous welfare impact on 
the host country while generally improving welfare of the source country. Finally, the most 
important welfare gains tend to accrue with the migrants themselves who typically reap 
substantial benefits from migrant.  
 
While there need not be a conflict of interest between source and host country, there may well be. 
This raises the question how could the positions of host and source country be reconciled, if 
indeed there were a conflict of interest?  
 
The solution to this problem looks simple: to make high-skilled migration a win-win proposition, 
both migrants and the rich host country would need to share some of their gains with the poor 
source country. And to make low-skilled migration a win-win proposition, both the poor source 
country and the migrants would need to share some of their gains with the rich host country5. In 
practice, however, there are two major obstacles to implementing such win-win outcomes.  
 
First, the required cross border transfers may be difficult to organize since the country supposed 
to pay compensation would have an incentive to renege on the transfer. This makes the problem 
of creating win-win strategies for migration much more difficult than creating win-win strategies 
for international trade: with trade, only domestic transfers are required to compensate any losers.  
 
Figure 1 – Theoretical migration preferences 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 The additional complication that a migrant may often have below average skills from the perspective of the rich 
host country but above average skills from the perspective of the poor source country is neglected here for ease of 
exposition. In order to create a win-win situation in this case, gains of migrants may have to be distributed to both 
natives of the rich host country and those who remain in the poor source country.  
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Second, the taxation of the rents of migrants may pose a serious problems in practice. Either such 
rents could be taxed as they accrue over the years. However, in that case the tax system would 
somehow have to discriminate against migrants for a long time after they migrate. But as 
migrants integrate, it would increasingly be perceived as unfair to burden them with higher taxes 
just because they have a migrant background. And legally, it might often be difficult circumvent 
the pervasive legal principle of non-discrimination as may be needed to capture an important 
share of the migrant rent.  
 
Alternatively, one could try to tax the rent of the migrant lump-sum as they enter the country. For 
example, migration permits could be auctioned and the proceeds of this auction would in effect 
be a tax on the economic rents of migrants. However, risk adverse and cash constrained migrants 
would find it difficult to bid in auctions of work permits at anywhere near the net present value of 
the expected rent of migration. Instead, one could of course auction the work permit to employers 
instead who are less risk adverse and cash constrained. However, this could also cause major 
problems. For the migrant to pay-off the employer for the auction investment, the migrant would 
typically have to work for that particular employer for many years below the going market rate. 
In the longer run, this would again raise questions of fairness and non-discrimination. 
Furthermore, transfer to new employers would have to involve problematic transfer fees 
arrangements that many regard as a modern form of slavery only just acceptable in the extremely 
well-paid world of football.   
 
Probably the first concrete proposal to use the rents of the winners of migration to compensate 
the losers was the Bhagwati tax (Bhagwati 1972). He proposed that high-skilled migrants should 
continue to be subject to some degree of taxation in their country of origin in compensation for 
the potential loss caused by their emigration to their home country.  However, for the reasons 
mentioned above, host countries have not be forthcoming in helping to implement such a scheme. 
But despite these difficulties, it is certainly worth pursuing the search for a clever implementation 
of win-win strategies since the fundamental economic rationale for the proposals remains sound 
today6.  
 
In the meantime, Europe could certainly go a long way towards gaining the moral high ground 
simply by fulfilling last year’s commitments to significantly increase development aid as a 
percentage of GDP. More specifically, the EU could make a point of subsidising education 
systems as an increasing function of the net inflow from any particular source country. 
Alternatively, rich countries could allocate more work permits for low-skilled workers, since a 
mixed strategy between high-skilled and lowskilled migration could also overcome the potential 
conflict of interest depicted in Figure 1.  
 
 
4.  Policy proposals 
 
If the potential distributional problems with the source countries can be fairly resolved, how 
should Europe go about attracting high-skilled migrants? Before answering this question, the 
term “high-skilled” migrant needs a better practical definition. 
 
                                                 
6 For a recent discussion of such strategies, see Freeman (2006). 
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Perhaps the most obvious definition of skill would be based on formal qualifications. This also 
makes some economic sense since formal qualifications tend to be a fairly good predictor of 
future earnings potential. This is relevant since most migrants move in their 20s or early 30s 
when their current earnings are only a relatively poor predictor of future earnings potential. 
 
However, from an economic perspective, a definition of skill ought to go beyond formal 
qualifications. As long as an immigrant is likely to achieve high earnings in the host country, he 
could be argued to have sufficiently rare talent so as to be regarded as highly skilled. This is the 
salary-based definition of skill. It is a highly flexible definition, capturing all kinds of 
professional excellence, including sports such as football and creative professions, which are 
difficult to standardise. 
 
 
4.1.  An EU-wide Blue Card for highskilled migrants 
 
In a points system of immigration, both definitions of skill can simply be used in parallel. In view 
of the high flexibility of points systems and their success in attracting high-skilled migrants, it 
seems likely that many European countries will adopt them over the coming years. 
 
This raises the question whether there is any room for European involvement regarding high-
skilled migration. High-skilled migrants could give rise to positive cross-border externalities 
within the EU similar to research and development. In principle, this argument might even be 
used to justify subsidies for attracting high-skilled migrants, perhaps in the form of a centrally 
financed Erasmus style programme to attract third country nationals. 
 
However, before going down the route of explicit subsidies, the attractiveness of Europe could be 
increased for free by providing third country nationals immediate access to the entire EU labour 
market. This will be more valuable from the perspective of the migrant than access to any 
national labour market due to the option value of the additional markets. Also, such an EU wide 
immigration regime would provide much greater visibility, predictability, and transparency than 
25 different national systems. 
  
Therefore, it is recommended to introduce a “Blue Card”, a European Green Card that would 
provide highly skilled third country nationals with instant access to the entire European labour 
market. This Blue Card would be allocated on the basis of skill through a Europe wide points 
system. Overall, such a system should make it significantly easier for Europe to compete for top 
talent with countries like the US or Canada.  
 
However, national initiatives to attract more high-skilled immigrants need not wait until a 
European Blue Card is introduced. The reason is that for most EU member states is would appear 
to be in their narrow self-interested to attract greater numbers of high-skilled migrants. EU level 
coordination would merely help countries to get there faster, and to go even further.  
 
 
Center for International Relations© 
 15
4.2.  Blue Diplomas for Foreign Graduates 
 
As one particular variant of the Blue Card, an entirely qualification-based “Blue Diploma” could 
be introduced. Any graduate of a Masters programme (or equivalent) from a participating 
university could be made eligible for a Blue card by virtue of his or her degree. Such a 
comprehensive and predictable arrangement would greatly help to attract foreign talent to 
European universities and to the European labour market afterwards. In principle, it would make 
sense to extend Blue Diplomas to universities outside Europe also. For a start, the top 100 non-
European universities, as measured by academic excellence, should also be included in the 
scheme. 
 
Even from a development perspective, the Blue Diploma could turn out to be beneficial. By 
providing guaranteed access to the European labour market without requiring a permanent 
presence, circular migration in the spirit of the proposal by Weil (2006) would be encouraged. 
The Blue Card would in effect act as an insurance policy for graduates from developing countries 
in case they would like to take the risk of going back home. They could always return to Europe 
for a second chance. 
 
This somewhat counter-intuitive reasoning that a permanent Blue Card might be a better tool to 
encourage circular migration than temporary work permits for the high-skilled deserves to be 
explored a little further. A closer investigation into the arrangements for high-skilled immigrants 
in the US and Germany found that in both countries, the only truly reliable means to always 
regain access to the host country labour market after a spell of indefinite duration in the home 
country is naturalization. Even the Green Card in the US or the German Niederlassungserlaubnis 
expire7 during a return to the country of origin or onward migration for an indefinite duration.   
 
In this light, the current temporary arrangement may very well be interpreted as a powerful 
incentive against circular migration. 
 
 
4.3.  An External Minimum Wage 
 
It turns out that the skills-based approach of migration also has an interesting application to EU 
enlargement. For new rounds of EU enlargement (Bulgaria, Rumania, eventually Turkey), the 
question arises of how to manage the transition to full labour mobility. 
 
As with immigration from third countries, the old member states will typically be more readily 
persuaded to open up their labour markets for highskilled than for low-skilled workers from new 
member states. Furthermore, due to the strictly limited duration of the transition process to full 
labour mobility, the dangers of abuse are less pronounced than they would otherwise be. Hence, a 
simple salary-based approach can be used to introduce full mobility for high-skilled workers 
while delaying access for lowskilled workers. 
 
                                                 
7 In Germany, an exception to that rule is made if the migration has previously lived in Germany for more than 15 
years.  
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Citizens of new EU member states would be allowed to enter work contracts that pay above an 
external minimum wage in all old member states. This wage floor could initially be set at the 
median wage in each old member state. With time, the external minimum wage could be lowered 
at a jointly agreed minimum pace to reach full free mobility. Of course, any old member state 
would be allowed to open its labour market faster, or even lift all restrictions immediately, if it 
chose to do so. 
 
Germany and other countries who have not yet introduced full mobility from the 2002 round of 
enlargement would be well advised to apply this approach immediately to attract high-skilled 
workers from the present new member states in Eastern Europe. Germany could introduce an 
external minimum wage of €30,000 per year for citizens of the new member states in Eastern 
Europe. For young workers, this threshold could even be set somewhat lower, at €24,000. As a 
result, the low wage sector in Germany would continue to be protected for the time being while 
Germany could start enjoying the benefits of skilled migration immediately. Over the next 3 to 5 
years, this external minimum wage could then be progressively lowered in order to assure a 
smooth transition to full worker mobility in 2009 or 2011. 
 
Interestingly, the Netherlands are already using the external minimum wage as a migration policy 
tool, albeit with a substantially higher earnings threshold. This raises the more general question 
why the external minimum wage might be better suited for a transition regime to full worker 
mobility while a Blue Card might be more suitable to regulate high-skilled migration from third 
countries. The key strength of the external minimum wage is that it offers a less bureaucratic and 
more economic definition of talent than a typical points based system. At the same time, this 
comes at the price a somewhat great potential for abuse. For example, an employer and a migrant 
could collude to agree on a higher wage on paper than in reality, thereby circumventing the 
external minimum wage relatively easily.  
 
Bearing this in mind, the external minimum wage is particularly well suited for an environment 
were the harm done by abuse. And clearly, during an introduction process of free movement for 
workers the harm done by abuse is much more limited than for third country migration since free 
movement will kick in after a couple of years anyway.  
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